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INTRODUCTION:  
POLISH PHILOSOPHICAL REVISIONISTS IN MARXISM 
 
The term ’philosophical revisionism in Marxism’ has several meanings 
and applications. In our opinion there are good reasons to restrict it to 
certain philosophical conceptions in the countries in which Marxism or 
Marxism-Leninism was/is the official ideology and the “state 
philosophy.”1 In the case of the Soviet Bloc countries the broader term 
’revisionism’ is applied to complex political, ideological, and intellectual 
phenomena that came into being after the death of Stalin in 19532. His 
death marked the beginning of a new era in these countries, although it 
became evident only in 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev started the 
process of de-Stalinization with his Secret Speech delivered at the 20th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he 
denounced Stalin’s repressive politics. In three Communist countries, in 
Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland, philosophical movements revising 
Marxism happened as a part of this process of de-Stalinization.  
 In Yugoslavia, the Praxis school was a philosophical movement 
formed in the1960s and 1970s by Gajo Petrović, Milan Kangrga and 
Mihailo Marković3. The members of the school emphasized the 
necessity for a return to the real Marx distorted by Lenin, Stalin, and 
                                                 
1 At least in philosophy revisionism should not be identified with any creative 
modification of an existing theory but restricted to the alterations and corrections of a 
doctrine, i.e., a philosophical conception or its orthodox version that is guarded 
ideologically and politically.  
2 There were, of course, earlier modifications of Marxism, starting with the views of 
Eduard Bernstein and Jean Jaures, Leon Trotsky, and later Titoists. However, Polish 
revisionists didn’t relate to these predecessors.  
3 The Yugoslavian edition of their journal Praxis was published between 1964 and 
1974, the international edition between 1965 and 1973. 
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Tito. They tended to refer to the works of young Marx and underlined 
the creative and practical nature of human beings; they opposed 
apologetic nature of Leninism and Stalinism and saw philosophy as a 
radical critique.  
 In Hungary it was the Budapest School, which emerged in the 
1960s after the Hungarian Revolution. Its center was the Sociological 
Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Science and its members were 
students and colleagues of György Lukács, among others Ágnes Heller, 
Ferenc Fehér, and György Márkus. At the beginning they were 
developing Lukács’s works on social ontology and aesthetics, and can 
be described as revisionists to the extend Lukács’s views were revisions 
of Marxism. Later they abandoned Marxism completely. 
 In Poland, unlike in Yugoslavia and Hungary, Marxist revisionism 
was never a social phenomenon based on the communal activity of 
cooperating individuals who were concentrated around one academic 
institution, a journal, or a summer school. It was always individualist 
and based on informal relations among scholars and men of letters 
living mainly in Warsaw and working mostly at the University of 
Warsaw (see: Mikołajczyk 2013, p. 40-56). They were philosophers, 
social and economical scientists, journalists, as well as novelists. This is 
why we prefer to talk about revisionists instead of revisionism.  
 What we are interested in here are the revisions of Marxism 
elaborated by Polish philosophers and usually triggered by ideological 
and political motives. There were—in a sense—two waves of Polish 
revisionism in Marxism and two generations of revisionists. The first 
wave took place in the 1950s and 1960s when “the term «revisionism» 
was used by the party authorities and official ideologists in Communist 
countries to stigmatize those who, while remaining party members or 
Marxists, attacked various Communist dogmas” (Kolakowski 1978, p. 
456). The term ’revisionist’ was then an invective used by the followers 
of the orthodox ideology and approved by party authorities but it was 
also used—somehow perversely, rebelliously, and proudly—by 
revisionists themselves. At the end of the 1960s its political use almost 
disappeared and it remained a stigmatizing term only within academic 
discussions. The second wave came about—quite surprisingly—in the 
1970’s and 1980’s when Marxism was subject to some new and 
interesting revisions. We deal briefly with the questions of how and 
why all this happened in the next two parts of this introduction.    
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Which historical, social and political circumstances made Polish 
philosophical revisionism possible? 
The years 1956 and 1957 were in Poland the time of a political thaw. 
Not only Stalin’s death and Khrushchev denunciation of Stalinism but 
also the mysterious death of Bolesław Bierut, a Polish communist 
leader, and the workers protest in 1956 caused significant changes in 
Polish politics. The Polish Communist party decided to break with the 
Stalinist legacy in favor of a more reformist and more democratic but 
also very nationalistic politics. Under the new leadership of Władysław 
Gomułka the negotiations with the Soviets brought small gains: a 
limited national autonomy, the abandonment of the collectivization of 
agriculture, the liberalization of the policy towards the Roman Catholic 
Church, and the improvement of economical situation.  
 De-Stalinization also enabled little room for ideological 
discussions. Since the Stalinist errors and distortions had been 
condemned critical and creative thinkers, usually party members, 
began discussing ideological issues. They did not yet reject Marxism as 
a philosophical and ideological foundation for the socialist project of the 
socio-economical progress nor did they distance themselves from 
political activity. Rather, their aim was to separate real Marxism from 
its Leninist and Stalinist distortions and to develop it creatively in order 
to adjust it to current conditions.  
 Alas, it soon turned out that the opening for ideological 
discussions was very narrow, superficial, and short-lasting. Nationalism 
and ideological dogmatism prevailed, and within the next ten years the 
political thaw was replaced with a much more rigid political system. “In 
1956 Poland was, relatively speaking, a country of free speech and free 
criticism” but soon “the party machine regained its lost positions step 
by step,” cultural freedom became restricted, and the economic reform 
was slowed down (Kolakowski 1978, p. 454). The Communist party still 
needed ideologists and the ideological justification of its policy but 
intellectuals (philosophers, sociologists, economists etc.) were less and 
less eager to deliver it. In the middle of the 1960s anti-intellectual and 
anti-Semitic tendencies in the Communist party grew stronger and 
stronger, and intellectuals were rapidly becoming more and more 
disillusioned. 
 The crucial moment of the process of eliminating the revisionist 
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movement from Polish reality happened in 1968. After the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war, the anti-Jewish attitude in the Polish Communist party had 
grown so strong that it became one of the triggers of the Polish 1968 
political crisis. Students’ and intellectuals’ protests were followed by 
purges within the Communist party and the expulsion from Poland of 
thousands of people of Jewish ancestry. Four of the thinkers whose 
views we discuss in this volume as revisionist, namely Zygmunt 
Bauman, Bronisław Baczko, Leszek Kołakowski, and Krzysztof Pomian, 
were not only expelled from the University of Warsaw but also forced to 
emigrate, and they left Poland in the period between 1968 and 1972. 
 The crisis within the Communist party and the deterioration of 
the conditions of life brought about social protests in 1970, and the 
leadership of the party was taken over by Edward Gierek. The need for 
ideological justification of the socialist system and politics disappeared 
ultimately and utterly because under his leadership the Polish 
Communist party began appealing to purely consumptionist ideology 
and to the idea of social progress arising from the technological 
modernization of the country. In this way the era of politically and 
ideologically motivated revisions of Marxism was over. Well, almost. 
Marxism might not have been guarded and dogmatically protected daily 
by the Communist party but it remained its official ideology and 
continued to be a frame of reference for many philosophers. When 
philosophers problematized its core concepts and infused it with new 
ideas they were revisionists, only if it was other philosophers who 
bothered to notice it. What is more, after 1968 the epithet ’a revisionist’ 
lost its political stigmatizing power, as almost no revisionists were left 
in Poland. The ideological connotation of the term quickly faded away 
and it remained—at best—an invective used in academic discussions.    
 
Who and how revised Marxism in Poland? 
The simple answer is that it was done by young intellectuals seeing 
themselves as obligated to social and political activity, eager to 
participate in the process of the constitution of a new postwar 
Communist society. Marxism was for them a philosophical world-view 
and a political program rising hopes for a better socio-economic reality. 
Revisionists were committed Communists and their attitude toward 
Marxism was almost religious. Marxism, Promethean and scientific at 
the same time, was supposed to replace religion, for which the radically 
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secular revisionists saw no place in the new society. (See: Mikołajczyk 
2013, p. 44-48) After the shock of 1956 they stuck by the slogan: 
’socialism–yes, distortions–no,’ they thought that “Marxist socialism 
was possible without Leninist political forms, that Communism might 
be attacked within «the framework of Marxism»,” and they “believed for 
some time ... that Stalinism was curable in the sense that Communism 
could be restored or «democratized» without questioning its 
foundations” (Kolakowski 1978, p. 461).  
 They saw themselves in an elitist way, i.e., as true and devoted 
Marxists fighting with dogmas, orthodoxy, myths, and unfounded faith 
both within Marxism-Leninism and outside it. They were willing to 
accept the position of sectarians, heretics, or apostates. Their political 
and ideological involvement forced them to attack pre-war but still 
active Polish philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School and other non-
Marxist thinkers (Roman Ingarden, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Stanisław 
Ossowski), who were classified as “bourgeois thinkers” unable to 
understand and assimilate Marxism.  
 This does not mean that we are dealing with Marxists who 
restricted themselves to studying Marx or to the laborious extracting of 
the one and only one correct and obligatory version of Marx’s 
philosophy. They studied Marx because they were academic 
philosophers but they were also actively involved in the building of 
socialist ideology and this is why they wanted to “return to «authentic» 
Marxism” in order to find in it arguments against both: religious views 
and nationalist ideas in Communist ideology (Kolakowski 1978, p. 460; 
Mikołajczyk 2013, pp. 56-59). As supporters of science and students of 
the history of philosophy, they rejected the Stalinist and Leninist 
additions to Marx’s philosophy, e.g., Stalin’s theory of language or 
Lenin’s theory of reflection. They abandoned Engels’ natural philosophy 
in favor of the world-view of the natural sciences. Finally, as creative 
and politically involved thinkers, they wanted to offer new ideas, to 
develop Marx’s philosophy, and to adjust it to the contemporary world 
of real socialism.  
 There were two sources of inspiration for the new vista. The 
Polish translations of Marx’s The Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts (in 1958) and Gramsci’s The Prison Notebooks (in 1950) 
became a revelation for the first generation of revisionists. The second 
source was the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, György Lukács, of other 
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western socialist thinkers, and even of analytic philosophers. This new 
vista was a humanistically oriented form of Marxist philosophy, so very 
different from the philosophical picture present in Marx’s Capital or 
even in the Manifesto (see: Kolakowski 1978, p. 463).  
 One can say that these readings allowed revisionists to realize 
that they opted for a humanist version of socialism and not for a 
socialist version of humanism, which—it seems—they had promoted 
before they became revisionists4. They wanted a socialist system with a 
human face that would be rational and protected from religious faith or 
ideological dogmas by following scientific rules of argumentation and 
testing theories. They searched for a philosophy and ideology more 
anthropocentric than dialectical, and more historical than materialist. 
All this shows in Kołakowski’s description of revisionism present in 
Eastern Europe as “an attempt to reform Communist systems in order 
to graft on to them respect for truth and logical arguments, for 
commonsense, democratic values, civil rights, economic efficiency, and 
other honorable things, in such a way that would leave the core of the 
system untouched” (Kolakowski 1989, pp. 207-208). He provides this 
picture, written much later, in 1988, with a critical comment stating 
that Marxist revisionism was internally inconsistent because the real 
core of the communist system was the permanent turning of all those 
“honourable things” into ruin. He adds that nonetheless this internal 
inconsistency was somehow effective in destroying and dismantling 
parts of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology (Kolakowski 1989, p. 
208).   
 The core of this new revisionist, non-dogmatic, humanist 
Marxism became the issues of human nature that self-constitutes itself 
in the process of social practice; of the role of an individual in history; of 
civil rights to freedom, criticism, and individual opinions; the nature of 
human cognition and its world; of alienation in the socialist society; as 
well as the problem of the possibility of ethics and morality without an 
absolute foundation and the need to separate ethics both from religion 
and politics. 
 The work on answers to these questions showed revisionists 
                                                 
4 It seems that the distinction wasn’t quite clear for them. The collection of 
Kołakowski’s essays published in 1968 was titled: Toward a Marxist Humanism (New 
York: Grove Press). 
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more and more clearly that intellectually honest and convincing 
answers cannot be put in concert together with Marxism. 
 The revisionist corrections of Marx’s philosophy had to decline 
because revisionists began to see the utopian, dogmatic, and 
irremovably oppressive character of Marxism and Communist systems, 
which had not been clearly visible at the beginning of the revisionists’ 
intellectual journey. Initially they idealized Marxist political program. 
Yet, living under Stalin and making “devastating comparison between 
socialist reality and the values and promises to be found in the 
«classics»” were the reasons for their disenchantment and turning 
against Marxism (Kolakowski 1978, p. 457). In the 1960s revisionists’ 
intellectual criticism and creativity contributed inevitably to the 
recognition of the restrictive and—in the case of many issues— 
oversimplified, schematic, ossified, and non-scientific nature of 
Marxism (Kolakowski 1978, p. 461). Instead of looking for a 
legitimization of the Communist state and party policy, which would be 
theoretically better and more convincing, revisionists started to 
question the very idea of legitimization (Kolakowski 1978, p. 461). 
Instead of looking for “authentic Marx” and a better version of 
Communist ideology they started a non-Marxian criticism of both 
Marxist doctrine and socialist reality.   
 
Leszek Kołakowski (1927-2009)  
Undoubtedly Kołakowski was the most famous and influential Polish 
philosopher deeply involved in revising Marxism. His revisionist phase 
started in the middle of the 1950s and was terminated in 1968 when 
long lasting persecutions, e.g., interventions of censorship into his texts 
and ultimately the ban on publishing, surveillance, and banishment 
from the Communist party were topped with the accusation that he—
like Socrates—was spoiling students’ minds. This accusation eventually 
resulted in the ban of teaching. For a creative philosopher, a passionate 
commentator of political reality, and a charismatic teacher that was the 
last straw, so Kołakowski left Poland and cast away his own revisionist 
Marxist position becoming—according to his own declaration—
conservative, liberal, and socialist (Kolakowski 1990). 
 Commenting on his political or ideological essays Kołakowski 
characterizes his position in the 1950s and 1960s as revisionist. He 
summarizes his own critical texts written during that period as a 
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“compendium of a «revisionist spirit»” with a value limited to the 
situation in that time. He saw his “attempts at the regeneration of 
Marxism” as ambiguous efforts to criticize the Leninist-Stalinist version 
of Marxism that was “strikingly loutish and vulgar.” He wanted to 
revise, rejuvenate, and improve Marxism as—in Kołakowski’s own 
words—an “effective instrument for the analysis of contemporary 
world” (Kołakowski 1989, p. 208). Yet, the real significance of these 
attempts was the demonstration that Marx’s thought was as useless for 
understanding and criticizing the present society as would be 
Descartes’ works in the role of a handbook of contemporary physics, 
though both remain important elements of the intellectual history of 
Europe (Kolakowski 1989, p. 209).  
 It seems, however, that he is far too modest. Zbigniew Mentzel 
very perceptively describes the philosophical significance of 
Kołakowski’s texts written in the 1950s and 60’s. Their significance 
does not reduce to the fact that their content was subversive towards 
political power. Far more important—especially from the philosophical 
point of view—was the fact that Kolakowski’s papers contained original 
thinking that stimulated his contemporaries and other people later to 
undertake their own critical thinking (Mentzel 1989, p. v). 
 One of the best examples of Kołakowski’s creativity is the 
monumental Main Currents of Marxism, published in Polish in 1976 but 
based on lectures given by Kołakowski earlier at the University of 
Warsaw. In the paper Regarding Marxism presented in this volume, 
Ryszard Panasiuk emphasizes that the book was planned by 
Kołakowski as a textbook and that his plan has been fulfilled. But Main 
Currents is much more than just a textbook.  Kołakowski looks at Marx’s 
philosophy and Marxism from his own, revisionist, philosophical and 
ethical perspective and evaluates both. As Panasiuk points out, for 
Kołakowski Marxism is not a scientific theory of society and history but 
a strictly philosophical project, based on a certain conception of the 
human being and on an axiology, both of which have a long 
philosophical pre-history. Kołakowski finds prophetic elements in 
Marx’s philosophy and sees similarities between it and the millenarians’ 
dream of a paradise on Earth. Panasiuk also emphasizes Kołakowski’s 
criticism of Marx’s conception of man that is based on assumptions, 
which cannot be maintained in the face of the results of practical 
realization of Marx’s program. 
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 In the present volume Kołakowski’s philosophy is also analyzed 
by Adam Olczyk in his paper Marxist Trait of Revisionism: Leszek 
Kołakowski’s Consistent Transition to Inconsistent Philosophy. Olczyk 
describes motives for Kołakowski’s shift from an orthodox Marxist into 
a main revisionary figure. Kołakowski firmly believed that Marxism, 
like any other philosophical system, was not a finite doctrine but a 
theory subject to modifications; that the process of its modification 
“will never cease”; that being a philosopher does not mean to theorize 
but also to practice philosophy; and that the obligation of a philosopher 
is to turn against “all the falsehood present in the world” and object to 
“any kind of fallacy.” Olczyk argues that what awakened Kołakowski 
from his dogmatic slumber was the focus on ethical issues and 
understanding “that philosophical issues are the ones that relate to our 
moral attitude” (Olczyk, p. 29). 
 
Bronisław Baczko (1924-2016) 
Neither original thinking nor revisionism can exist without the art of 
asking questions and problematizing both answers and questions. 
Baczko was a thinker praised for his ability to problematize every 
philosophical system. (See: Pomian, 1989, pp. 13-14) He was a 
professor at the University of Warsaw until 1968 and an important 
leader of the intellectual community. He was one of the founders of the 
Warsaw School of the History of Ideas and his seminars at the 
University of Warsaw and the Polish Academy of Science, offering the 
possibility of open discussion, brought together many academics from 
different disciplines and crowds of students.  
 In his philosophical works Baczko was strongly influenced by his 
friends, who were historians. He wanted to modify historical studies of 
philosophy by explaining philosophical ideas against the background of 
their historical context, particularly the context constituted by 
communal ideas, images, and visions of the world, as well as fears, 
hopes, and obsessions circulating in the society of a given period. 
According to Helder Mendes Baiao, for Baczko there were no 
exceptions, even “Marx needed to be historicized” (Baiao, p. 44). Baiao 
deals in his paper On History and Liberty: the «Revisionism» of Bronisław 
Baczko with the philosophical assumptions of the Warsaw School of the 
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History of Ideas5 and with Baczko’s contributions to the research 
perspective elaborated by the School. A specificity of its approach to 
historical ideas was “to look for the values” or for “humanist content in 
ideas.” This is why young Marx was interesting for Baczko: “he studied 
religion from an anthropological point of view” (Baiao, p. 43). 
 Baczko’s early works, e.g., his book on Rousseau, were not only 
(hi)stories of ideas. They had also a general philosophical topic of 
perennial significance, namely the problem of the relation between the 
intellectual and social institutions and the ethical aspect of their 
relation (Pomian 1989). Baiao is interested in ethical principles 
followed by Baczko in his historical research. A historian has the 
obligation to pursue truth and avoid ideological manipulation of the 
past forced by political pressure. Baiao emphasizes that the core of 
Baczko’s influence was located in his way of philosophizing: in his 
methodology and in the views that underlie it, namely individualism 
and historical relativism. These assumptions were evidently in conflict 
with Marxist emphasis on the priority of a society over individual and 
on teleologically mobilized historical necessities. The reconstruction 
presented in the text allows Baiao to claim that during his whole 
scientific career Baczko remained committed to „his vision of an «open» 
conception of History” (Baiao, p. 57). 
 
Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017)  
Our choice of Bauman as a revisionist philosopher is somehow 
controversial because in the 1950s and 1960s he was a sociologist, not 
a philosopher. As Dariusz Brzeziński reminds us in his Human Praxis, 
Alternative Thinking and Heterogeneous Culture: Zygmunt Bauman’s 
Revisionist Thought the academic career of Bauman started in 1953. At 
that time Bauman was a loyal member of the Communist Party “and a 
follower of the Marxist-Leninist ideology” (Brzeziński, p. 64)   
 He  wrote his first revisionist paper relatively soon after October 
                                                 
5 Contrary to Baiao and César R. Fernandes, to whom he refers, we think that the 
translation of ’Warszawska szkoła historii idei’ into ’the Warsaw Circle of Intellectual 
History’ is not a correct one in one important aspect: it characterizes the nature of 
historical studies done by its members whereas the Polish name characterizes the 
object of their studies. Intellectual history can refer to anything, whereas the topic of 
the studies of the Warsaw School were ideas and their history was more socio-
cultural, i.e., showing the cultural context of studied ideas, than intellectual. 
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1956.  He criticized the members of the Communist party and 
“expressed his hope that  significant changes will take place in Poland.” 
He also claimed that the “mechanist”—as he described it later—version 
of Marxism cannot be the foundation of social research and 
improvements. In his revisionist phase, before leaving Poland, Bauman 
moved gradually toward philosophy since his inspiration for criticizing 
the official Marxist doctrine were—typically for revisionists—the 
works of young Marx. He turned towards a praxist interpretation of 
Marx.  
 Brzeziński emphasizes that revisionist ideas, elaborated by 
Bauman in papers written after 1956, did not vanish after 1968, when 
Bauman was expelled from the University of Warsaw and left Poland. 
Revisionist ideas are the basis of Bauman’s conception of utopia, his 
critique of modernity, his focus on human praxis, and the belief in the 
“heterogeneity of culture” (Brzeziński, p. 63). Also the idea that 
intellectuals are obliged to critical thinking and to opposing rigid 
schemes and patterns became a guidepost for his future intellectual 
journey.  
 
Adam Schaff (1913-2006) 
The choice of Schaff as a Marxist revisionist is equally controversial, 
though for a different reason. He was seen as an official party 
philosopher and ideologist, not as a revisionist moving away from 
Marxism. Schaff, a devoted Communist, even a Stalinist, and the 
member of the Central Committee of the Communist party for many 
years, distanced himself from revisionists, and never abandoned 
Marxist alliance. Yet, even he earned the epithet of a revisionist.  
 Studying the reality of socialist society was common to Schaff 
and Bauman. Both saw the need to introduce into Marxism changes 
motivated by its confrontation with the socialist reality. In Marxism and 
the Human Individual, published in 1965, Schaff argued, in concert with 
Bauman, that socialist societies are not free from alienation. This idea, 
as well as his understanding of class struggle, were clearly revisionist 
for party authorities. In 1968 Schaff was expelled from the Central 
Committee and lost his influence on Polish philosophy. Krzysztof 
Świrek in his paper ’Getting Hands Dirty’: on Adam Schaff's Political 
Writings is right in stating that classifying Schaff as a revisionist did not 
have its source in a substantial change of his philosophical or political 
Marcin M. Bogusławski, Barbara Tuchańska 
Introduction: Polish Philosophical Revisionists in Marxism 
[xii] 
views but in the very restrictive nature of Marxism in the 1960s as well 
as in “tactical and personal games within the Party” (Świrek, p. 84). 
Świrek tracks the paradoxical nature of Schaff’s attitude that earned 
him a label of an orthodox revisionist. On the one hand Schaff wanted to 
keep a “critical distance towards the political practice of existing 
socialism,” on the other hand, he wanted to „stay faithful to what he 
understood as strategic interests of socialist countries” (Świrek, p. 102). 
He believed that the “theory of the author of Capital provides the key to 
understanding the present and future tendencies of developed 
societies” but simultaneously he tried to develop Marxist theory in the 
light of problems unknown to the Classics (Świrek, p. 92). 
 
Krzysztof  Pomian (1934-) 
In the case of Pomian, a decade younger than Kołakowski and Baczko, 
in fact, their student, the revisionist phase of philosophical journey was 
very short. He was active in revisionists’ circles, shared their attitudes 
and the need for being actively involved in the socialist reality of Poland 
and yet he quickly realized that what interested him was not ethics and 
discussion on values or history of philosophy but historiography. In his 
more general historiographic considerations he accepted the general 
view of the Warsaw School of the History of Ideas that ideas could not 
be explained by oversimplified reference to class background of their 
authors or followers. 
 Marcin Leszczyński in Historiography after Revisionism: Remarks 
on Pomian’s Idea of Writing History analyses Pomian’s revisionism 
against the background of Polish revisionism in general. He aptly points 
out that historiographical revisionism is simply a reinterpretation of 
the past. In this sense it is “a typical condition of history as discipline” 
(Leszczyński, p. 104). However, revisionism—as it was understood in 
Poland—was more than that. It had philosophical, political, and ethical 
aspects. Leszczyński shows that Pomian’s theoretical propositions in 
historiography originated from his critical attitude towards Marxism-
Leninism, and towards historical materialism in particular. Pomian 
advocated historical pluralism and presentism, neither of which was in 
agreement with the orthodox version of historical materialism. 
 
Jerzy Kmita (1931-2012) 
Historical materialism was the main frame of reference also for two 
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thinkers of the second generation of Polish modifiers of Marxism: Jerzy 
Kmita and Leszek Nowak. Both were working at the Adam Mickiewicz 
University in Poznań and established the Poznań Methodological 
School6.  
 Whereas the first generation of Polish revisionists modified 
Marxism for ideological reasons, the intention of the second generation 
was simply to revise it for theoretical purposes. Kmita and Nowak 
considered Marx’s approach inspiring, but were convinced that without 
methodologically driven changes Marx’s legacy will be lost and his 
social theory could not be successfully applied to describe and explain 
reality. Both approached Marx initially from a perspective of the 
philosophy of science, both reconstructed Marx’s scientific method, 
both were inspired by Marx’s way of thinking.  
 In the paper entitled Jerzy Kmita’s Methodological Interpretation of 
Karl Marx’s Philosophy: from Ideology to Methodological Concepts Anna 
Pałubicka emphasizes the contribution of the Poznań Methodological 
School to Polish Marxist theory. As the title of the paper suggests, she 
focuses on Kmita’s methodological reinterpretation of Marx, done from 
the perspective of the methodology of the humanities. Kmita was more 
interested in Marx’s way of thinking and his methodology than in the 
“content” of his philosophy. Regardless of the changes Kmita introduced 
into historical materialism, Pałubicka believes that there are no reasons 
to classify Kmita’s proposition as revisionist. She reminds us that even 
though Kmita himself saw that he was correcting Marx, he still declared 
that he stood true to Marx.  
 However, we think that Kmita’s crucial conceptions are 
revisionist. The methodological perspective allowed Kmita to claim that 
the most important legacy of Marx is cultural or historical relativism 
and the biggest weakness of Marx’s methodology is the fact that Marx 
applied the approach of natural sciences to social and human sciences. 
Both these statements could be considered revisionist not only in 
reference to the Marxism of the 1950s but also in the late 1960s and 
1970s, in spite of the fact that Marx’s methodology was not under the 
protection of the ideological guardians of Marxism. Also two other 
conceptions of Kmita, namely his conception of a humanist 
interpretation and the functional-genetic model of explanation were 
                                                 
6 Together with Jerzy Topolski. 
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revisionist. It is true that in the 1970s an activist (praxist) approach 
was already sufficiently fortified in the Polish academic Marxism to 
allow philosophers to consider an individual as actively constituting 
itself in socio-historical environment and not simply as a passive 
intersection of social relations. However, in historical materialism the 
concept of self-constitution ought to be balanced by the concept of 
being constituted by social forces. Kmita’s formal idea of a rational 
agent acting in the way described by the humanist interpretation was—
according to orthodox critics—as far away from historical materialism 
as was the model of functional-genetic explanation, based on the 
rejection of the causal explanation of cultural phenomena. 
 
Leszek Nowak (1943-2009) 
Even less orthodox were the ideas developed by Nowak in his 
conception of (socialist) social-economic reality. Krzysztof Brzechczyn 
traces changes in Nowak’s and his followers’ attitude towards Marxism 
in his paper From interpretation to refutation of Marxism: On Leszek 
Nowak’s non-Marxian historical materialism. One of Nowak’s first ideas 
referring to social reality, the adaptive explanation of the relationships 
among elements constituting socio-economic formations, elaborated in 
the 1970s, was revisionist. It could have been politically condemned as 
a possible instrument of “an unacceptable political critique of real 
socialism” if not “a very sophisticated hermetical terminology and 
logical apparatus” which made Nowak’s theory difficult to understand 
outside the academia (Brzechczyn, p. 170). By contrast, a non-Marxian 
historical materialism, proposed by Nowak in the 1980s as a theory of a 
socialist system, was less hermetic and “definitely went very far beyond 
the borders set by Party authorities”  (Brzechczyn, p. 170). Nowak’s 
theory of triple class power, belonging to the non-Marxian historical 
materialism, caps the categorial interpretation of Marxist dialectics and 
the adaptive interpretation of socio-historical dependencies. The non-
Marxian historical materialism became unacceptable for the 
Communist party particularly when Nowak engaged himself and his 
ideas in the Solidarity movement. As a consequence, he not only had to 
face academic criticism but also imprisonment and dismissal from the 
university. There is no exaggeration in the statement that he was the 
last victim of the battle against revisionism in Polish Marxism. And so 
be it.   
Marcin M. Bogusławski, Barbara Tuchańska 
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